A Green Road to Development: Environmental Regulations and Developing Countries in the WTO by Skinner, Jonathan
Skinner_final_cpxns.doc 2/22/2010 4:06:49 PM 
 
245 
 
A GREEN ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT:  
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO 
JONATHAN SKINNER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The intersection of environmentalism and economic 
development is of growing interest and renewed prominence—as are 
the tensions associated with balancing these interests.  With the 
collapse of the Doha negotiations in the summer of 2008, a fractured 
chasm continues to grow between the developed and the developing 
worlds.1  However, the conflicts do not evidence a failure of the 
international trade regime; instead they signify the growing influence 
and sophistication of developing states.  The rise in influence of these 
states, however, is viewed by some as a threat to environmental 
conservation.  Skeptical states even proposed alternative 
international organizations to address the perceived diverging 
ambitions.2  Nonetheless, environmentalists should not advocate 
withdrawing from the trade-environment debate, but instead should 
encourage sustainable development as an alternative to ostracizing 
any group of Nations.  This paper contends that the World Trade 
Organization is the proper forum for greening the road to 
development and bridging the interests of the developed and 
developing worlds. 
The Marrakesh Declaration of 19943 affirmed the establishment 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), effectively transitioning the 
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 1. See, e.g., Collapse of Doha Round of Global Trade Talks Disappointing, Says Ban, UN 
DAILY NEWS, July 30, 2008, at 2•3, available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/2008/ 
30072008.pdf. 
 2. Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 
343–46 (2002). 
 3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1144 (1994), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
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international community from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)4 framework to the WTO system.5  The historic 
agreement of the WTO recognized the importance of integrating 
developing countries into the international trade community whilst 
also preserving the environment.6  The framers emphasized that 
sustainable development is a primary objective, though the means 
thereto should reflect the “needs and concerns” of countries “at 
different levels of economic development.”7  Indeed the change in 
language from GATT 1947 evidences negotiations recognizing “that 
the objective of ‘full use of the resources of the world’ set forth in the 
preamble . . . was no longer appropriate to the world trading system 
of the 1990s.”8  Though not an explicitly binding obligation, the 
preamble of the WTO does “add[] colour, texture and shading to [an] 
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement.”9  
The Marrakesh Agreement also created a permanent WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) that “contribute[s] to 
identifying and understanding the relationship between trade and 
environment in order to promote sustainable development.”10  In 
practice, however, the problem of striking a balance between the 
unique situations of developing countries and preserving 
environmental values appears, in WTO case law, to be insoluble. 
 
 4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1153, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
190 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 5. World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations iii-iv (1999). 
 6. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at pmbl.  “Recognizing that [all parties’] relations 
in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living . . . and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while 
allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development.”  Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 152, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. – Shrimp].  Compare 
“Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living . . . and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding 
the production and exchange of goods,” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947] (emphasis added), and “while allowing for the 
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development,” Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 9. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 153. 
 10. World Trade Organization, The Committee on Trade and Environment (‘Regular’ 
CTE), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2009). 
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Historically, environmental regulations were viewed as a North-
South divide between developed and developing countries (or 
between importing and exporting countries), whereby developing 
countries were restricted from market access based on environmental 
regulations.  Initially, unilateral action by developed countries 
improperly overstepped the boundaries of domestic regulations and 
invaded national sovereignty.11  Currently, politicians remark that 
unilateral environmentally friendly measures might even create 
environmentally harmful competitive advantages, such as pollution 
havens12 in developing countries, where only through multilateral 
agreements could developing countries be brought up to international 
standards of environmental protection. 
Though a World Environmental Organization (WEO)13 or even 
an International Environmental Court (IEC)14 might be a satisfactory 
forum to detangle the web of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements currently in effect, a WEO or an IEC is an unnecessary 
addition to the global community.  Instead, the WTO is adequately 
structured to accommodate environmental concerns, does reference 
environmental agreements, and is developing a greener 
jurisprudence, even with respect to the unique concerns of developing 
countries.  As discussed below, the WTO is, in fact, the optimal 
system to reconcile environmental protection and development. 
Part I explains the establishment of the adjudicating bodies of 
the WTO and discusses the sources of law from which adjudicators 
derive duties and responsibilities.  Part II explores the textual rules of 
the WTO system, focusing primarily on GATT article XX(b), XX(g) 
and the article XX chapeau, as the primary exceptions to a Member’s 
 
 11. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna I), 
DS21/R – 39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter U.S. – Tuna I]. 
 12. But see Kevin C. Kennedy, Implications for Global Governance: Why Multilateralism 
Matters in Resolving Trade-Environment Disputes, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 31, 49 (2001) 
(“[E]conomic studies have shown that tough environmental standards at home do not, standing 
alone, cause companies to relocate abroad.  As Professor Edith Brown Weiss points out, there is 
little empirical evidence to substantiate the claim that countries with lax environmental 
standards attract foreign industries that are heavily regulated.  Environmental costs are just one 
factor among many that figure in the decision to make a foreign investment.”). 
 13. I have selected the acronym WEO, favored by Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment 
Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 330–31 (2002).  For a discussion on the World 
Environment Organization versus Global Environment Organization nomenclature see Sanford 
E. Gaines, The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the WTO and What To Do 
About It, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 324 n.16 (2003).  Though stylistic 
differences in terminology can be heavily debated, it is not within the scope of this paper. 
 14. See Audra E. Dehan, An International Environmental Court: Should There Be One?, 3 
TOURO J. TRANSNAT’L L. 31, 52 (1992). 
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WTO obligations that are frequently invoked in defense of 
environmental regulations.  Part III contextualizes the tensions 
between development and environmental protection and addresses 
several major concerns held by some developing countries.  Finally, 
Part IV examines the latest jurisprudence concerning environmental 
regulations and developing countries, in particular the Appellate 
Body report of Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres.15 
I. WTO COURTS AND SOURCES OF WTO LAW 
The WTO was created through contractual agreements among 
sovereign states, establishing a system of values embodied in rules 
(the GATT) and a mechanism through which trade disputes could be 
adjudicated (the courts).  The General Agreement of the WTO 
provides for two adjudicating bodies—the Appellate Body (AB) and 
the panels.16  The bodies are not referred to specifically as courts in 
the WTO agreements, but are “usually referred to in literature as 
quasi-judicial bodies”17 with similar functions and bound by the same 
restrictions as traditional courts.  In discussing what law WTO 
adjudicating bodies have used, there is a fine distinction between 
sources of law and interpretive elements that inform the parties and 
WTO courts in adjudication of disputes.18 
Professor Petros Mavroidis of Columbia Law School clearly 
illustrated this distinction in the following chart (though it is by no 
means an exhaustive list): 
Sources of Law and Their Interpretative Elements19 
Sources of Law  Examples 
Covered agreements: DSU20 Appendix 1 
Incorporated international  
agreements: Havana Charter 
 
 15. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil – Tyres]. 
 16. Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 421, 421–22 (2008). 
 17. Id. at 421 n.4. 
 18. Id. at 421. 
 19. Id. at 426. 
 20. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
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  Agreements referred to in: 
   TRIPS21 Agreement 
  SCM22 Agreement 
Secondary law:                                     AuthoritativeInterpretations 
  Amendments 
  Waivers 
  Decisions 
  Recommendations 
  International agreements to  
  which WTO is a party 
Implied powers: Allocation of burden of Proof 
                                                                Amici participation 
  Extended third-party rights 
Interpretive elements 
Oxford English Dictionary 
Travaux préparatoires of the WTO Agreement 
Practice/agreements subsequent to WTO Agreement 
GATT panel reports 
WTO panel and AB reports 
International agreements not incorporated into the WTO        
 Agreement 
Acts adopted by various international organizations 
Decisions by international courts 
Domestic law and practice 
Unilateral declarations by WTO members 
Customary international law 
General principles of law 
Doctrine 
Primary sources of law for the WTO adjudicating bodies are 
limited to the covered agreements in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) and explicitly refer to incorporated 
 
 21. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 22. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter SCM]. 
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international agreements.23  There is an implicit reference in the DSU 
that the adjudicating bodies are bound under the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)24 which 
“authorizes the use of extra-contractual . . . interpretative elements in 
order to interpret an international contract.”25  Though the rules 
prohibit the Dispute Settlement Body (the body which adopts panel 
and AB reports) from “add[ing] to, or diminish[ing] the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements,”26 the VCLT 
explains that adjudicating bodies may use extra-contractual 
provisions and understandings to interpret GATT articles.  In fact, 
the first AB decision under the WTO recognized article 31 of the 
VCLT “as customary or general international law of interpretation 
applicable also for WTO dispute settlement, stressing that WTO law 
should not be ‘read in clinical isolation from public international 
law.’”27  Additional sources of general international law include 
judicial decisions issued by the International Court of Justice; and, 
though not binding on the parties in the WTO pursuant to VCLT 
31.3, any relevant rules of international law are applicable to the 
contextualization of the obligations within the WTO system, 
including universally binding principles of customary international 
law.28 
Prior to 1998, the panels and AB rarely invoked environmental 
principles in determining the obligations of states party to a dispute 
under the GATT.  One major issue, however, did arise under GATT 
article XX(g):29 whether living animals could be considered an 
“exhaustible natural resource.”  In 1991, the unadopted panel report 
 
 23. See Mavroidis, supra note 16, at 427. 
 24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
 25. Mavroidis, supra note 16, at 425; see also DSU, supra note 20, at art. 3.2. (“The 
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”). 
 26. Mavroidis, supra note 16, at 425 (quoting DSU, supra note 20, at art. 3.2). 
 27. Seventh Annual WTO Conference, WTO Dispute Settlement: Current Issues, The 
GMOs Dispute, May 22–23, 2007,  Interpreting WTO Law and the Relevance of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements in EC-Biotech, 2 (quoting Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 16, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter 
U.S. – Gasoline]) [hereinafter EC-Biotech Conference Report]. 
 28. VCLT, supra note 24, art. 31.3(c) (“any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties.”). 
 29. GATT 1994, supra note 4, at art. XX(g) (relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption). 
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in U.S. – Tuna I avoided this discussion altogether by considering 
instead the extraterritorial nature of the measures adopted by the 
United States and determined that the U.S. measures were not 
justified under article XX(g).30  The panel held that the range of 
policy exceptions under the GATT should be negotiated through 
amendments or supplementary provisions to the GATT, not through 
unilateral measures that impair trade.31  However, the panel and AB 
under the newly implemented system of rules and considerations 
reconsidered this issue in U.S. – Shrimp in October 1998.32 
The AB in U.S. – Shrimp “note[d] that the generic term ‘natural 
resources’ in article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its content or reference but 
is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’.”33  It then turned to the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea34 (UNCLOS) to 
define jurisdictional rights and determined that together with Agenda 
21,35 the Convention on Biological Diversity,36 and the Resolution on 
Assistance to Developing Countries (adopted in conjunction with the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals37), natural resources included non-living as well as living 
resources.38  The AB also noted that the establishment of the CTE 
evidenced the intention of the Ministers at Marrakesh to reflect the 
principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development39 
 
 30. U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶ 5.34. 
 31. See id. ¶ 6.3. 
 32. US – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 152. 
 33. Id. ¶ 130 n.109 (citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 31 (June 21) (explaining that treaty “interpretation cannot remain 
unaffected by the subsequent development of law”)). 
 34. Id. ¶ 130 n.110 (“Done at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/122; 21 International Legal Materials1261.”).  The United States stated at oral 
hearing that with respect to fisheries law, the UNCLOS reflects international customary law. 
 35. Id. ¶ 130 n.112 (“Adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, 14 June 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1.”). 
 36. Id. ¶ 130 n.111 (“Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC5/4; 31 
International Legal Materials 818.”). 
 37. Id. ¶ 130 n.113 (“Final Act of the Conference to Conclude a Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, done at Bonn, 23 June 1979, 19 
International Legal Materials 11, p.15 . . . [and noting] that Malaysia, Thailand and the United 
States are not parties to the Convention.”). 
 38. Id. ¶ 131. 
 39. Id. ¶ 154 n.147 (“We note that Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration . . . states: ‘The right 
to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental 
needs . . . .’  Principle 4 . . . states that: ‘In order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and 
cannot be considered in isolation from it.’”). 
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and Agenda 21.40  In interpreting article XX(g), the AB looked to 
several multilateral environmental treaties, including treaties which at 
least one party to the dispute had not signed or had signed but had 
not ratified.41  In effect, U.S. – Shrimp confirmed that the WTO 
system is not self-contained and should not be read in isolation of 
international principles and developments in the law. 
Despite the broader interpretive reach of U.S. – Shrimp, the 
dispute settlement panel in EC – Measures affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products42 “limited the application of article 
31(3)(c) [of the VCLT] to the rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between all the parties to the treaty being interpreted.”43  
The panel’s approach appears to deviate from previous jurisprudence 
but was not ultimately appealed.44  Though the relevance of 
multilateral environmental agreements to WTO disputes is currently 
under debate, it is indisputable that states jointly-party to any bi- or 
multilateral agreements may not dodge their respective treaty 
obligations.  Nevertheless, if principles of international environmental 
law crystallize into customary international law, the principles may be 
incorporated into the WTO system as a source of law or a strong 
interpretive element that the dispute settlement system may rely on 
for purposes of security and predictability.45  However, even if the 
adjudicating bodies do not consider the extra-contractual obligations 
and interpretations, the GATT rules are independently well 
constructed to accommodate environmental exceptions. 
II. GATT 1994 
The GATT provides general exceptions to the two core 
principles of international trade, article I (Most-Favored-Nation 
Treatment) and article III (National-Treatment Principle), through 
invocation of GATT article XX.  Though necessary to preserve non-
trade values, the general exceptions to GATT obligations are limited 
 
 40. Id. ¶ 154. 
 41. See, e.g., id. ¶ 130 n.110•13. 
 42. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) 
[hereinafter EC – Biotech]. 
 43. EC-Biotech Conference Report, supra note 27, at 2. 
 44. See id. at 12. 
 45. DSU, supra note 20, art. 3.2 (“The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”). 
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in scope and controversial.  Specifically, article XX(b)46 and article 
XX(g)47 are subject to ample dispute and discussion in academic 
circles and have been the central issues of adjudication in many panel 
and AB decisions.  Despite hammering upon the exceptions, WTO 
courts have forged a balancing mechanism to equitably weigh the 
rights and duties of states invoking article XX.  While states are 
permitted to unilaterally enact environmental legislation, they may 
not mask arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised 
restrictions on international trade in a green agenda. 
A.  Article XX(b): Necessary to Protect Human, Animal or Plant Life 
or Health 
For a measure to fall within the scope of article XX(b), it need 
only satisfy a two-part analysis: (1) Is the substance of the policy or 
the measure in question the protection of human animal, or plant life 
or health? and (2) Is the measure for which the exception is being 
invoked necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health?  
For a measure to be necessary and qualify under article XX(b), the 
measure must be “among the measures reasonably available . . . , that 
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with the other GATT 
provisions.”48  Additionally, “a panel must be satisfied that [the 
measure] brings about a material contribution to the achievement of 
its objective.”49  In analyzing the degree of contribution, there is “no 
requirement under article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 to quantify, as 
such, the risk to human life or health,”50 instead “[a] risk may be 
evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms.”51 
In determining whether a measure is necessary within the 
meaning of article XX(b), “a panel must consider the relevant factors, 
particularly the importance of the interests or values at stake, the 
extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure’s 
 
 46. GATT 1994, supra note 4 (“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”). 
 47. Id. (“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”). 
 48. GATT Panel Report, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, 
BISD 36S/345 (Jan. 16, 1989), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/gatt/87tar337.asp. 
 49. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 151. 
 50. Appellate Body Report, European Communities•Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 167, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC – 
Asbestos]. 
 51. Id. 
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objective, and its trade restrictiveness.”52  If a measure is deemed 
necessary, it is then compared to alternatives that are reasonably 
available while still “providing an equivalent contribution to the 
achievement of the objective.”53  article XX(b) provides broad 
discretion to states to determine what measures are important to 
protect human, animal, or plant life or health, but limits a State’s 
ability to unfairly prejudice international trade with overreaching and 
overly restrictive measures that are not necessary to the stated goals.  
The exception inherently captures some of the language of the 
chapeau in restricting unnecessary restrictions on trade by requiring 
the lesser restrictive alternative measures should any be reasonably 
available.  The requirement does not prohibit a State from pursuing 
policy objectives, nor does it endanger human, animal, or plant life or 
health, but instead proscribes a State from breaching its general 
obligations to the GATT in order to economically harm other 
exporting states. 
B.   Article XX(g): Relating to the Conservation of Exhaustible Natural 
Resources if Such Measures are Made Effective in Conjunction 
With Restrictions on Domestic Production or Consumption 
Interpreters of article XX(g) are required to look at the 
relationship “between the measure at stake and the legitimate policy 
of conserving exhaustible natural resources.”54  For purposes of article 
XX(g), the protectionist measures should be “primarily aimed at” 
conserving exhaustible natural resources such that a “substantial 
relationship” exists between the rule and conservation.55  However, 
“the phrase ‘primarily aimed at’ is not itself treaty language and was 
not designed as a simple litmus test” for article XX.56  “Without 
abandoning the ‘primarily aimed at’ formula, [the WTO Appellate 
Body] has construed that as requiring only a ‘substantial relationship’ 
between means and ends.”57 
The AB in U.S. – Shrimp determined that “[i]n its general design 
and structure . . . [the U.S. measure] is not a simple, blanket 
 
 52. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 178. 
 53. Id. 
 54. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 135. 
 55. Id. ¶ 136 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 19). 
 56. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The 
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 278–79 (1997) (citing U.S. – 
Gasoline, supra note 27, at 19). 
 57. Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised 
Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739 n.61 (2001). 
Skinner_final_cpxns.doc 2/22/2010  4:06:49 PM 
Winter 2010 A GREEN ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT 255 
prohibition . . . imposed without regard to the consequences (or lack 
thereof) of the mode of harvesting . . . .”58  It then focused on the 
design of the measure and determined that the “implementing 
guidelines . . .  [are] not disproportionately wide in [their] scope and 
reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and 
conservation . . . .  The means are, in principle, reasonably related to 
the end.”59 
Furthermore, in citing U.S. – Gasoline, the AB held that article 
XX(g): “. . . is appropriately read as a requirement that the measures 
concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported 
[products] but also with respect to domestic [products].”60  Essentially, 
the clause requires even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, 
in the name of conservation of exhaustible natural resources.61 
The requirements under article XX(b) and (g) are necessarily 
broad and permit states to implement measures that deviate from the 
core obligations in the WTO.  However, once a measure falls within 
the scope of one of the general exceptions, the measure must survive 
the scrutiny of the chapeau.  “[T]he chapeau serves to ensure that 
Members’ rights to avail themselves of exceptions are exercised in 
good faith to protect interests considered legitimate under article XX, 
not as a means to circumvent one Member’s obligations towards 
other WTO Members.”62 
C. Article XX Chapeau63 
While article XX(b) and (g) have been interpreted broadly, the 
chapeau acts as a sieve, preventing disguised restrictions on 
international trade from passing through the WTO rules and 
regulations as justified environmental regulations.  The AB in US – 
Gasoline implemented a sophisticated and flexible analysis of article 
XX, and found that though the U.S. program for gasoline quality 
regulation was provisionally qualified under paragraph (g), the 
measures as applied resulted in unjustifiable discrimination.64  The 
report 
 
 58. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 141. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. ¶ 143 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 20-21). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, at 215 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 22). 
 63. In international law, the chapeau is an introductory text appearing in a treaty that 
broadly defines its principles, objectives, and background. 
 64. Gaines, supra note 57, at 759. 
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would not turn on whether the trade measure addressed an 
environmental issue covered by article XX(b) or (g) (Tuna – 
Dolphin I), or even whether the effect of the measure on 
environmental quality was direct or indirect (Tuna – Dolphin II).  
The major issue would become whether the challenged government 
had applied a measure within the scope of (b) or (g) in a way that 
resulted in ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ contrary to the 
conditions in the chapeau to article XX.65   
More importantly, the chapeau embodies the customary norm of 
good faith and permits a Member to act so long as that Member does 
not unreasonably abuse its rights under the WTO.66 
The chapeau does not explicitly describe measures that constitute 
arbitrary, unjustifiable or disguised restrictions on international trade, 
but the AB has provided examples that do constitute impermissible 
restrictions on trade.  The AB in U.S. – Shrimp explained that a 
uniform standard otherwise acceptable for domestic regulations 
breaches principles of international relations if one Member requires 
another Member to “adopt essentially the same comprehensive 
regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force 
within that Member’s territory, without taking into consideration 
different conditions which may occur in the territories of those other 
Members.”67  Additionally, the AB called for flexibility in a regulatory 
program and ultimately concluded that the U.S. certification program 
lacked transparency and violated principles of due process.68 
Even though many protectionist measures may be provisionally 
justified under article XX(b) and (g), WTO courts have fashioned a 
counterweight to prevent overuse of the General Exception.  The 
Court has stated that “the purpose and object of the introductory 
clauses of article XX is generally the prevention of ‘abuse of the 
exceptions . . . ‘“69 and do not permit states to cloak arbitrary or 
unjustifiable restrictions on international trade with protectionist 
measures otherwise permissible under article XX(b) and (g).  In 
effect, the chapeau of article XX70 reigns in broad and sweeping 
measures designed to preserve non-trade values that violate State 
WTO obligations. 
 
 65. Id. at 759-60. 
 66. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 158. 
 67. Id. ¶ 164. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 180-81. 
 69. Id. ¶ 151 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 22). 
 70. “Subject to the requirement that measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries . . . or a 
disguised restriction on international trade . . . .”  Id. ¶ 113. 
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However, this should not be viewed as an affront to non-trade 
values, but as an equitable balance of rights and duties preserved in 
the structure of article XX.  Members are permitted to enact 
legislation and pursue regulations that have reasonable trade 
restrictive effects so long as the measures do not violate the chapeau 
of article XX.  Nevertheless, many developed countries have 
attempted to conceal trade protectionist measures under green 
legislation, leading developing countries to challenge the measures in 
the WTO courts.  It should not be assumed that developing countries 
do not share similar environmental ambitions, but instead that they 
rely on established WTO panels to determine whether “green 
legislation” is in fact an invasive or disguised restriction on 
international trade. 
III. TENSIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
The majority of environmental regulation conflicts in WTO case 
law are initiated by developing countries against more restrictive 
measures adopted by developed countries.  Developing countries are 
concerned that green protectionist measures are merely disguised 
barriers to international trade.  The concerns of developing countries 
fall into three broad categories: Abuse of Power (unilateral measures 
“give governments greater power and opportunity in the free-trade 
era to protect their own industries against foreign competition”71); 
Sovereignty (conflicts between extraterritorial regulations and 
national sovereignty); and Economic and Social Costs (a lack of 
understanding in developed countries “of the domestic 
environmental, social, and economic context of developing 
countries . . .”72).  Though the concerns are reasonable, the WTO 
system is well equipped to balance the interests of environmental 
protection and development and even encourages sustainable 
development as a primary objective in international trade. 
A. Abuse of Power 
A major concern held by many developing countries is that the 
ability to institute unilateral environmental measures gives greater 
 
 71. Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges After China’s WTO Accession, 32 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 62 (2007). 
 72. Id. 
Skinner_final_cpxns.doc 2/22/2010  4:06:49 PM 
258 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM Vol. 20:245 
power to developed states.  Eco-imperialism,73 a term characterizing 
developed countries’ imposition of environmental values upon 
developing countries, has become a rallying call against unilateral 
environmental measures.  Because the measures frequently impose 
stricter standards for environmental protection, developing countries 
maintain that the gaps in environmental standards have resulted in 
“green barriers” to trade.74 
To address the concern for divergent standards, the WTO 
implemented the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS 
Agreement)75 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement).76  The TBT and SPS Agreements “acknowledge 
the importance of harmonizing standards internationally so as to 
minimize the risk that sanitary, phytosanitary, and other technical 
standards will become trade barriers.77  Standard harmonization not 
only benefits developing countries by introducing internationally 
sound research programs, but also strengthens the multilateral 
framework for solving global environmental problems.78  Developing 
countries are no longer hindered by complicated atypical programs 
that would burden trade infrastructure and hamper international 
trade because a collection of reliable international standards will 
provide notice to states entering the international market.  Because 
all countries will be limited to internationally recognized and 
approved standards, a State may not abuse the more vulnerable 
infrastructure and economy of a developing country. 
 
 73. See generally John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: 
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992) (discussing various aspects of 
eco-imperialism). 
 74. See Zhao, supra note 71, at 56–57. 
 75. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Jan. 1, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS]. 
 76. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
TBT]. 
 77. Zhao, supra note 71, at 57.  “Both agreements are included among the Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods annexed to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement . . . .  SPS 
Agreement Art. 3.1 states: ‘To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a 
basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in 
this Agreement . . . .  TBT Agreement Art. 2.6 states: ‘With a view to harmonizing technical 
regulations on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall play a full part, within the limits of 
their resources, in the preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of 
international standards for products for which they have either adopted, or expect to adopt, 
technical regulations . . . .”  Id. at n.67. 
 78. See id. at 57. 
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TBT article 2.4 and SPS article 3.1 both require that Members 
base any technical, sanitary, or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards.  article 3.1 of the SPS also limits the inquiry 
to existing international standards and article 3.2 explicitly states that 
any sanitary or phytosanitary measure that is based on an existing 
international standard shall be deemed necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health, and presumed consistent with the SPS 
Agreement and the GATT. However, note that the AB in EC 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products cautioned that 
international standards and guidelines are not to be read as binding 
norms.79 
The TBT, however, broadens the inquiry to any relevant 
international standards or parts thereof and includes standards which 
are not yet in existence so long as their completion is imminent.  The 
AB in EC – Trade Description of Sardines determined that standards 
implemented by international standardizing bodies do not need to be 
based on consensus, because TBT Annex 1.2 omitted any 
requirement of consensus in the text.80  The AB then went on to 
explain that in order to be relevant, the standards would have to bear 
upon, relate to, or be pertinent to the regulation.81  Next, the relevant 
standard should be the main constituent or fundamental principle of 
the regulation imposed.82  It is then incumbent upon the complainant 
to show that the standard relied on by the respondent Member is both 
ineffective and inappropriate. 
Unlike GATT article XX, TBT article 2.2 imposes affirmative 
obligations on a contracting Member, requiring that technical 
regulations “not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil [sic] 
a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment [sic] 
would create.”83  The preamble of the TBT requires that no measure 
be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between [countries] where the same 
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.”84  
Essentially, TBT article 2.2 constructs a similar framework embodied 
in the relationship between the GATT article XX listed exceptions 
 
 79. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 165, 
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan.16, 1998) [hereinafter EC – Hormones]. 
 80. Appellate Body Report, EC – Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 227, WT/DS231/AB/R 
(Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC – Sardines]. 
 81. See id. ¶ 232. 
 82. Id. ¶ 245. 
 83. TBT, supra note 76, art. 2.2. 
 84. SPS, supra note 76, pmbl. 
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and the chapeau.  The legitimate objectives for the purposes of the 
TBT are not limited as they are in GATT article XX; though an 
objective pursued by any multilateral environmental agreement could 
arguably be considered legitimate within the context of the TBT. 
Nevertheless, article 2 of the TBT will not govern a measure that 
is not a technical regulation but merely a technical standard.  Under 
the TBT, a technical regulation is a document that identifies a group 
of products, stipulates or provides product characteristics (explaining 
that the characteristics of a product include any objectively definable 
feature or quality), and requires mandatory compliance.85  Thus, 
technical regulations within the TBT receive stricter obligations than 
standards or conformity assessment procedures, because technical 
regulations require mandatory compliance and therefore result in a 
de facto trade embargo for noncompliance with the regulation. 
Additionally, the TBT and SPS Agreements provide for 
technical assistance to facilitate the implementation of article 
provisions in the agreements.  article 11 of the TBT explains that 
developing countries may request advice “on the preparation of 
technical regulations.”86  article 4 of the SPS Agreement introduces 
the concept of “equivalence” as a reasonably acceptable alternative 
measure to complying with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  
Paragraph 8 of the Decision on Equivalence provides further that 
Members shall give “full consideration to requests by another 
Member, especially a developing country Member, for appropriate 
technical assistance to facilitate implementation of article 4.”87  The 
supplemental agreements strengthen the WTO’s commitment to 
facilitating technological and intellectual capital investment in 
developing countries.  Equivalence and technical assistance 
encourages technologically advanced and sustainable development 
whilst recognizing the special circumstances of developing countries. 
B.   Extraterritorial Regulation & Sovereignty: U.S. – Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna & U.S. – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products. 
A related concern to the abuse of power is the issue of national 
sovereignty.  Trade restrictive measures for the purposes of 
 
 85. EC – Asbestos, supra at note 50, ¶¶ 67-68. 
 86. TBT, supra note 76, art. 11.1. 
 87. SPS Comm., Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ¶ 8, G/SPS/19 (Oct. 24, 2001) (emphasis 
added). 
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environmental protection may have extra-territorial effects and thus 
infringe on national sovereignty by imposing values of developed 
countries upon developing countries.  The WTO courts are mindful of 
international law limitations on policy-based national legislation and 
have not disregarded the principle of sovereignty in dispute 
resolution.88  However, the WTO Agreement is also committed to 
sustainable development and permits a State to implement legislation 
as part of national policy programs for the purpose of environmental 
protection.  What the courts need to decide, therefore, is where to 
draw the line between policy-based exceptions to the general WTO 
obligations and invasive extra-territorial legislation that breach the 
rights of other member states.  For measures based on environmental 
protection, the WTO courts have three significant but divergent 
opinions which address the issue. 
1. U.S. – Tuna I & U.S. – Tuna II89 
In the Pacific Ocean, yellowfin tuna often swim beneath schools 
of dolphins.90  Frequently, while harvesting tuna with purse seine nets, 
dolphins are trapped in the nets and die (unless otherwise released).91  
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) decreed that 
dolphins were entitled to protection from harmful fishing techniques 
and set standards for American fishing fleets and for countries whose 
fishing boats catch yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical areas of the 
Pacific Ocean.92  If a country exporting tuna to the United States 
could not prove to trade inspectors that the tuna fishing methods met 
standards set out in U.S. law, the United States would refuse entry of 
the tuna products.93 
In January 1991, Mexico requested that the contracting parties of 
GATT 1947 establish a panel to address U.S. restrictions on tuna 
imports.94  Mexico argued that “the embargo provisions in MMPA . . . 
were inconsistent with the general prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions under article XI . . .” and that the MMPA “established 
 
 88. See, e.g., U.S – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶¶ 6.2-6.4. 
 89. Panel Report, U.S. – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna II), GATT Doc. DS29/R 
(June 16, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. – Tuna II]. 
 90. WTO, Mexico etc. versus US: ‘tuna-dolphin’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
envir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2009). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶ 1.1. 
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discriminatory specific conditions for a specific geographical area, in 
violation of article XIII . . . .”95 
Though the panel decision was not ultimately adopted (the panel 
was convened prior to the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994), the 
findings did acknowledge the deep concern for environmental 
protection.  The panel accepted the conservation goals of the U.S. 
policy but found the import ban nevertheless violated core provisions 
of the GATT.96  The panel held that articles XX(b) and (g) limited a 
State to protecting the environment within the jurisdiction of its 
government and not extra-territorially.97 
In 1992, the European Union filed its own complaint in U.S. – 
Tuna II.98  The second panel report addressed the same U.S. measures 
and the report was circulated in 1994.  The second panel “found no 
basis in the GATT or its negotiating history for such a jurisdictional 
limitation on article XX . . . the panel concluded that the U.S. tuna 
embargo did not [violate GATT] . . . because it did not protect the 
dolphin resource directly but operated by putting trade pressure on 
other governments to change their policies with respect to dolphin 
protection.”99 
The second panel abandoned the implied jurisdictional 
limitations for environmental measures in article XX but required 
that measures qualifying under article XX(g) must be ‘primarily 
aimed at’ the conservation of a natural resource.100 
2. U.S. – Shrimp 
Many species of sea turtles have been identified and are 
distributed around the world in subtropical and tropical waters.  
Though the turtles migrate between foraging and nesting grounds, 
much of their lives are spent at sea.101  Because of increased human 
contact with sea turtles, many turtle populations have been directly 
(for their meat, shells, and eggs) or indirectly (through incidental 
capture, habitat destruction, or water pollution) harmed.  In response, 
 
 95. Id. ¶ 3.1(a). 
 96. See U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶¶ 6.3-6.4. 
 97. See id. ¶ 5.28. 
 98. U.S. – Tuna II, supra note 90, § I. 
 99. Gaines, supra note 57, at 757. 
 100. Id.  For a discussion on the current test under GATT 1994, art. XX(g), see generally 
Schoenbaum, supra note 57 (discussing the current test under GATT 1994, art. XX(g)). 
 101. WTO, India etc versus U.S.: ‘shrimp-turtle’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2009). 
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the United States passed the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973102 
and listed five species of sea turtles that passed through U.S. waters as 
endangered or threatened.  The Endangered Species Act prohibits 
the “taking” of protected sea turtles in U.S. territory.  The Act 
specifically required U.S. shrimp trawlers to use “turtle excluder 
devices” (TEDs) in their nets to reduce the likelihood of unlawful 
“takings” of sea turtles during trawling expeditions.  Section 609 of 
U.S. Public Law 101-102, enacted in 1989, directly addressed the 
importation of harvested shrimp that adversely affected protected sea 
turtles and prohibited their sale in the United States. Furthermore, 
section 609 required shrimp harvesting nations to certify a regulatory 
program that would either reduce their incidental taking rate to levels 
comparable to United States or prove that their harvesting did not 
threaten protected turtles.103 
Between October 1996 and January 1997, India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Thailand issued a joint request to “establish a panel to 
examine their complaint regarding a prohibition imposed by the 
United States on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp 
products.”104 
The AB in U.S. – Shrimp reaffirmed its rejection of the 
traditional GATT approach of U.S. – Tuna I & II, and relied on the 
U.S. – Gasoline report in recognizing the chapeau of article XX as the 
critical test for a trade measure to qualify as an exception to the 
general obligations.105 
Neither the appellant nor the appellee asserted exclusive 
jurisdiction over the migratory turtles, at least not while the turtles 
were freely swimming in their natural habitat, but the endangered 
species of turtles at stake were known to pass through waters within 
the jurisdiction of the United States. 106  The Appellate Body 
concluded, without addressing the issue of jurisdictional limitations, 
by determining that there was a “sufficient nexus between the 
migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the 
United States for purposes of article XX(g).”107  However, the AB 
noted that the United States had failed in good faith to negotiate 
 
 102. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533–1544 (2006). 
 103. WTO, India etc versus U.S.: ‘shrimp-turtle’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2009). 
 104. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 1. 
 105. See id. ¶¶ 118-19. 
 106. Id. ¶ 133. 
 107. Id. 
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multilateral solutions and compromises prior to enacting the 
legislation.108 
But, when the implementation panel revisited the U.S. measure 
in U.S. – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Recourse to article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,109 the panel and AB 
found that the U.S. had in good faith attempted to negotiate an 
international agreement with Malaysia (the complainant party) and 
also included a flexible certification program that would have enabled 
the U.S. to consider the particular conditions prevailing in other 
member states.110  The AB therefore concluded that the measure was 
neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable within the meaning of the chapeau 
of article XX,111  and that the U.S. was under no obligation to 
conclude an international agreement but merely an obligation to 
negotiate with the parties in the dispute for the protection of sea 
turtles.112 
In international law, sovereignty is no longer an impenetrable 
wall.  The U.S. – Shrimp decision signifies the AB’s decision to depart 
from heavy reliance on traditional international law rhetoric and 
clarifies the states’ rights under the general exceptions to the 
obligations of the GATT.  Because the WTO Agreement is an 
international contract among states, the WTO courts are increasingly 
reluctant to rely on national sovereignty as an absolute shield to the 
responsibilities of member states.113  Measures may need to be 
enacted to deal with certain international concerns such as global 
climate change because some member states will be first to 
experience the consequences of significant atmospheric changes.  
Also, because many environmental measures are inherently trade 
restrictive, the WTO System cannot be seen as a suicide pact that 
prohibits Members from taking any precautionary measures or 
instituting any regulations; rather, the regulations must be properly 
constructed to prevent disguised or unnecessary restrictions on trade.  
In a time of global financial crisis, reactive and inflammatory rhetoric 
should not prompt protectionist legislatures to abstain from fulfilling 
their state’s  obligations to the international system—similarly with 
 
 108. Id. ¶ 171. 
 109. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
 110. Id. ¶ 153. 
 111. See id. ¶ 105. 
 112. Id. ¶ 123. 
 113. See, e.g., U.S. - Shrimp, supra note 8. 
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global climate change, a Member should rely on international 
negotiations and consensus before imposing restrictions that invade 
the domestic legislatures of another Member State.  With an eye 
towards international negotiations or multilateral environmental 
agreements, WTO courts may properly weigh the rights and duties of 
member states to determine equitable but reasonable solutions to the 
trade disputes. 
C. Economic and Social Costs 
It is debatable whether developed countries are the “proper 
arbiters [of] how social, economic, and environmental matters are to 
be dealt with . . . .”114  In fact, WTO courts, as previously discussed, 
have discouraged unilateral efforts of environmental regulation, as 
have many international environmental bodies.115  Unilateral 
implementation results in ineffective and disparate regimes for 
solving a global phenomenon.  Additionally, unilateralism encourages 
a downward spiral where countries are free to individually invoke 
regulatory measures in the guise of environmental protection 
resulting in a tangled web of disparate regimes that do not actually 
address the problems of environmental degradation.  Because the 
effects of environmental pollution are not necessarily felt 
immediately, nor are they always localized to the source of pollution, 
it is incumbent upon the international community to negotiate 
multilateral solutions to jointly combat environmental degradation. 
Multilateralism is important for at least three reasons.116  First, 
unilateralism is not legally viable under customary international law 
or under the GATT 1994 and the WTO multilateral trade 
agreements.117  Second, multilateralism is optimal to protect resources 
in the global commons, as unilateral approaches rarely resolve the 
underlying problem.118  And finally, “multilateralism, in contrast to 
unilateralism, is a rules-based, not power-based approach to 
international relations.”119  Relying on multilateral negotiations and 
efforts will allow Members to properly proceed in the face of 
 
 114. Zhao, supra note 71, at 62. 
 115. Most notable has been the adoption of principles featuring trade and the environment 
in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development at the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).  See UNCED, June 3-14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 116. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 68. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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uncertainty.  Though Members are not required to wait for scientific 
certainty before acting, a Member should not hastily respond to 
environmental problems without some understanding of the 
economic and social costs of unilaterally imposed measures that could 
create a global patchwork of different environmental standards and 
essentially freeze international trade. 
IV. RECONCILIATION THROUGH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement recognizes that all 
Members should be permitted to expand the production of and trade 
in goods and services, and allows for use of the world’s resources, but 
explains that the use be “in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development . . . .”120 
The objective of sustainable development is the merging of 
environmental values and economic development—however, 
previous WTO cases suggested that environmental values did not 
accommodate the “needs and concerns” of developing countries.121  In 
2006, Brazil – Tyres became the first WTO dispute initiated by a 
developed country addressing a trade-restrictive measure introduced 
by a developing country that was also designed to achieve 
environmental goals.  In previous cases, the AB restricted developed 
country WTO Members from imposing their environmental standards 
on developing country WTO Members without first considering the 
conditions of those members or their ability to comply with the 
standards in question.122  “The Appellate Body has thus recognized 
that some environmental measures originate from states that have 
high standards of environmental protection, reflecting both the 
strength of those states’ economies and their corresponding 
technological and financial ability to adhere to such standards.”123  In 
Brazil – Tyres, the critical issue is a mirror image of previous cases: a 
developing country sought to impose restrictions on developed 
countries for environmental and health concerns. 
 
 120. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at 9 (emphasis added). 
 121. See, e.g., U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11. 
 122. Kevin R. Gray, International Decisions: Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreated Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, World Trade Organization Appellate Body, December 3, 
2007, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 610, 612 (2008) (citing U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶¶ 161-63). 
 123. Id. 
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The case involved a Brazilian import ban on used tires, leading to 
a challenge by the European Community (EC).  The rationale 
underlying the ban prompted the EC to call for a WTO panel to 
determine whether the measures were an improper invocation of 
article XX and were unduly restrictive.  As part of Brazil’s obligations 
to fellow members of the Mercado Coman del Sur (Mercosur), 
Brazilian courts exempted member states of the Mercosur Agreement 
from the import ban.124  The discretionary exemption and court 
injunctions were the basis for the AB’s decision determining that the 
ban arbitrarily discriminated between Mercosur and non-Mercosur 
States.  It concluded that the import ban could not discriminate 
between States and suggested that Brazil implement an absolute ban 
on imported retreaded tires to come into compliance with its WTO 
obligations.125  The language of the decision suggests, however, that 
developing countries could implement internal regulations as part of 
a comprehensive plan of environmental protection and preservation. 
The AB did agree, however, with the panel’s conclusion that the 
measures were provisionally justified under article XX(b).  The 
measures were necessary because Brazil identified health and 
environmental risks associated with used tire stockpiles because of 
environmental health dangers caused by fire (“[t]ire fires can produce 
massive quantities of mercury, benzene, and other cancer-causing 
poisons”126) and increased incidents of mosquito-borne diseases 
(discarded tire stockpiles are optimal mosquito breeding grounds 
because of water stagnation).  On appeal, the EC argued that the 
accumulation of used tires was a matter of poor disposal and 
collection, and ultimately poor management.127  The AB disagreed 
and reasoned that some “public health and environmental problems 
are so complex that they can be addressed only through numerous 
interacting measures, including an import ban . . . .”128  In fact, 
substituting alternative measures “would undermine the total policy 
by ‘reducing the synergies between its components, as well as its total 
effect’ . . . .”129  It concluded that trade measures could be part of a 
State’s larger environmental management scheme, within the 
 
 124. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 242. 
 125. Id. ¶ 258. 
 126. Gray, supra note 122, at n.2. 
 127. See Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 157. 
 128. Gray, supra note 122, at 613 (citing Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 151). 
 129. Id. (citing Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 172). 
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sovereign discretion of the WTO Member, and outside the purview of 
WTO dispute settlement. 130 
Protection of the environment is a vital and important interest of 
WTO members.  To determine the ability of a State to implement 
suggested alternative measures, the AB considered the unique 
characteristics of Brazil as a developing country and did not accept 
the EC’s assertion that there are less restrictive alternatives 
reasonably available.131  Because it would not be economically viable 
to implement the alternatives in Brazil, the suggested measures are 
not in fact available.  “The Appellate Body ruled that a country’s 
‘capacity . . . to implement remedial measures that would be 
particularly costly, or would require advanced technologies’ . . . can 
be relevant to whether the alternatives are reasonably available.”132  
The AB further clarified that an environmental regime does not 
require the elimination of risks but merely that the restrictive 
measure was “apt to produce a material contribution to the 
achievement of its objective.”133 
The Brazil – Tyres decision emphasized the Marrakesh 
Agreement’s recognition of countries “at different levels of economic 
development” and their respective “needs and concerns” regarding 
pursuit of a comprehensive program of sustainable development.134  
This case effectively reconciled the tension between development and 
environmental protection specifically with respect to waste 
production.  Brazil – Tyres signifies the WTO’s commitment to 
sustainable development and its respect for individualized programs 
of environmental protection under broader multilateral agreements 
addressing environmental protection and preservation.  The WTO is 
on its way to greening its jurisprudence with the assistance of the 
international community. 
CONCLUSION: CONSOLING THE LORAX135 
The Seussian paradigm in The Lorax136 illustrates the friction 
between development and environmentalism. 
 
 130. Id. at 613. 
 131. See Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 209. 
 132. Gray, supra note 122, at 613 (citing Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 171). 
 133. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 151. 
 134. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at 9. 
 135. For a broader discussion, see generally Armin Rosencranz, Lex & The Lorax: Enforcing 
Environmental Norms under International Law: The Origin and Emergence of International 
Environmental Norms, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 309 (2003). 
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The Once-ler and Lorax each crusade for competing values, but 
this is not necessarily the world developing today.  Though tensions 
exist between competing trade values, multilateral agreements are 
generally the accepted course of action to reconcile differences and 
encourage global response to environmental degradation.  In order to 
effectively engage the international trade community, environmental 
interests should participate in national and international trade policy 
debates and should not ostracize governments or disregard the WTO 
system.137  Establishing an independent body or court will not 
necessarily be internationally accepted, thereby limiting its 
jurisdiction, and may be seen as a competing body hampering 
development and trade.138  Because any environmental regulations 
will inherently have trade restrictive effects, a multilateral 
environmental agreement should be conscious of the framework and 
obligations under the WTO System and work within that system to 
achieve desirable results; otherwise a measure that is provisionally 
justified under a multilateral environmental agreement may be struck 
down for wide-reaching economically unsustainable effects.  
Moreover, few environmental agreements have incorporated an 
enforcement mechanism or dispute settlement body that is already 
accustomed to the interwoven values and policy rationales underlying 
trade restrictive measures. 
The WTO, because of its amenability and application of 
interpretive sources of law, including multilateral environmental 
agreements, is an optimal arena for encouraging sustainable 
development.  Moreover, the reasonable concerns of developing 
countries are adequately addressed in the WTO system, and the 
GATT rules provide exceptions for environmental protection, but 
limit disguised restrictions to international trade.  Finally, the WTO 
accounts for the conditions of developing countries and does not 
require installation of or investment in unreasonable measures in 
those countries.  The WTO may not be the most protective 
organization of non-trade values, but it is the optimal system to 
integrate competing concerns and advocate on behalf of sustainable 
development. 
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world trade.  See Ian F. Fergusson, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress: 
The World Trade Organization: Background and Issues, at 2 (May 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/98-928.pdf. 
